Many Wests and One Global Civilization of Multiple Modernities

Peter J. Katzenstein, Cornell University, pjk2@cornell.edu
February 2011

COMMENTS WELCOME. PLEASE DO NOT CITE OR QUOTE WITHOUT EXPRESS PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR

Anglo-America, this book argues, is one important part of the West. There exist others, most importantly in Europe (in its French and Germanic variants) and in the Americas (in its Hispanic, Caribbean and other variants). The relationship between these different parts of the West is neither parallel, in the form of amicable co-existence, nor hierarchical, in the form of clear subordination. Rather, the relationship between the different parts of the West is layered. The trajectory of a manifold West has no fixed points of origin or destination.

What about Greece as the foundation of European and Western civilization? Western civilization mixed Graeco-Roman with African and Semitic influences. Athena most likely was neither black nor white but brown. To regard Greece, Europe and the West as set apart from its Islamic, Jewish, and Orthodox-Christian roots strains the historical record. Much of Aristotle’s works would have been lost without the Islamic scholars and librarians who preserved so much of it. Judaeism is European, illustrated by the strain and stain of Western anti-Semitism. And Eastern Rome rivaled Rome a second center of Western civilization. Furthermore, between 1458 and 1821 Greece was incorporated into the Ottoman empire which left a profound impact on the fiscal incapacities of the Greek state. Freed from the grip of a military junta in 1974, Greece rode a wave of European civilizational sentiment to full membership in the European Economic Community (EEC). On economic issues Europe’s enfant terrible has since exploited a European system of financial largesse. In 2010 Greece helped trigger Europe’s sovereign debt crisis. From beginning to end Greek history offers a perfect illustration of multiple Wests.

1 Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the 2010 annual meetings of the International Studies and the American Political Science Association. I would like to thank the discussants at these meetings: Duncan Bell and Andrew Gamble at the ISA meetings, Robert Keohane, Ron Krebs, Jennifer Mitzen, and Herman Schwartz at the APSA meetings. I have also learned greatly from my discussions with and the generous criticisms, comments and suggestions by all of the contributors to this book. For their invaluable research assistance I am indebted to Emma Clarke, Elisa Charbonnel, and Jill Lyon. Finally, I would like to acknowledge with enormous gratitude the generous financial support that I received in 2009-10 from Louise and John Steffens Founders’ Circle Membership at the Institute of Advanced Studies in Princeton.

After giving a brief conceptual overview of civilizational analysis (Part 1) and elucidating briefly the concept of a manifold West (Part 2), I illustrate the West with specific reference to America and Europe (Part 3) and Americanization and Europeanization (Part 4). I discuss the civilization of multiple modernities containing both Islam and Anglo-America (Part 5), before ending with a brief conclusion (Part 6).

1. Civilizational Analysis: A Conceptual Overview

Civilizations provide us with the broadest social context and world views that help shape everyday practice through the exercise of power in institutions "World images," argues Gary Hamilton, "have decisive effects on how such spheres of activity are actually interpreted and organized as going concerns." All civilizations engage in the illusion that they are singular and thus blind us to the existence of other ways of imagining and living life. But we live, undeniably, in a world of plural civilizations. Furthermore, the illusion of singularity is often fostered by intellectual and political entrepreneurs who seek to serve particular interests through discursive moves and political strategies. Under the cold light of evidence, the claim to singularity typically does not hold up. Civilizations are distinctive and differentiated, not unique or unified.

Language and Religion. The two most important and distinctive characteristic of a civilization are its languages as well as literary and religious traditions. Separately and together both provide for ample raw material from which to fashion multiple traditions of civilizational life. Language is a constitutive element of civilization. In the 18th century the French language and the French court were the epitome of civilization and were emulated in polite society throughout Europe. Frederick the Great of course spoke German – but only to his horses. In India language is a central marker of civilization. The very choice between “Hindu” or “Indian” civilization poses a central question. ‘Hindu civilization,’ Susanne Rudolph argues, suggests religion as the one overarching cultural component that overrides all others. ‘Indian civilization’ makes space for numerous cultural components and healthy contestation between them. Rudolph chooses the composite over the coherence view of Indian civilization. The Indian subcontinent encompasses states that are divided in terms of religion but share linguistic, literary and other cultural characteristics, and thus give credence to the concept of Indian civilization. Furthermore, Rudolph argues, India invalidates the distinction between civilized and uncivilized based on the existence of a written language. With Brahmans trained in an oral tradition reciting the Vedas, Sanskrit survived for hundreds of years under the social convention of oral transmission; writing would have violated the sacred. Similarly, Bruce Lawrence argues that Islamic civilization arose in the context of nomadism with a strong oral tradition. The absence of a written language at the origin, as in Islam, or

---

3 Hamilton 2010, 37.
5 Lawrence 2010.
over prolonged periods, as in India, shows that language plays a different role in the evolution of civilizations. In East Asia for millennia Chinese was used for writing in Korea, Japan and Vietnam even though these countries retained their indigenous languages and in some cases their own script. Yet, the emphasis on language and elite culture, as Rudolph points out, overlooks the importance of language as a vehicle of xenophobic nationalism and, in the case of India, of imperialism and colonialism. Indians continue to debate what is the language of Indian civilization. Even though as a practical matter Indian elites rely widely on English, and even though the prominence of English makes it possible for India’s service sector to leap-frog other developing economies, nobody thinks of it as India’s language.

Religion is a second marker of civilization. Today we refer conventionally to “Western religion” rather than “Western Christendom” as the successor to “Latin Christendom,” the term of choice used widely before the Enlightenment. Western Christendom was in fact a deeply divided religious tradition. In the 17th century that division was revealed in Protestant and Catholic mass slaughters during the Thirty Years War. As late as the turn of the 20th century Protestants viewed Catholicism with much suspicion as a subversive transnational religion, just as many Catholics and Protestants today regard Islam. In his discussion James Kurth builds and elaborates on Huntington’s argument about the importance of Reform Protestantism for the origin and evolution of Western and American civilization. Especially provocative is Kurth’s argument that the Protestant core of the American creed has come to include the civil religion of a secularized Protestantism – what he calls the heretical, neo-pagean religion of America’s secular elite. Religious diversity rather than universal religion marks the resurgence of religious vitality in contemporary world politics. Multiple traditions of secularisms, in the plural, point to the intensification or persistence of religious consciousness and politics with which these secularisms must engage. While Christianity and Islam have expanded in the 20th century, so have various forms of nonreligious and atheistic belief systems. Varieties of religious and secular belief systems thus continue to exist side by side in a world of plural and pluralist civilizations.

Africa. The West has frequently been likened to an Über-civilizations with global reach. It is not, however, as classical theories of Euro-centrism suggest, the fountain of civilization. Africa, not the West, is the world’s Ur-civilization. Human life started in Africa. And African civilization is defined by and evolved at the intersections of other civilizations. Africa’s name has variously been traced to Berber, Greco-Roman, Phoenician or Arab origins. And geographically Africa shares with other

---

6 Kang 2010.
7 Kurth 2010.
8 Kurth 2010.
9 This view is in sharp contrast to Huntington’s 1996, 47 unitary conception of civilizations that leaves him undecided whether Africa is, or is not, a civilization in its own right.
civilizations that it is not easily delimited. North Africa, for example can been seen as a Western extension of the Arabian Peninsula, a northern extension of sub-Saharan Africa, or a southern extension of Europe.

V.Y. Mudimbe traces the idea of Africa as a story of European philosophical, literary and cultural invention. Even in the most explicitly Afro-centric analyses, interpretations of Africa have largely relied on a Western epistemological order. European explorers of Africa brought back a wealth of descriptive evidence that supported reified categories of thought distinguishing between civilized Europeans and savage natives. European soldiers fought military campaigns that presumed the existence of that divide. And the language of missionaries was similarly predetermined in expressing a clear normative discourse grounded in the same distinction. Only after World War I and with the beginning of the ngritude movement did the possibility of African discourses of otherness become relevant. Yet even that movement was shaped by multiple Western traditions rather than resulting from authentic African intellectual currents. John Jackson concurs that European scholarship has either ignored African civilizations or Europeanized African achievements, especially Egypt’s, by transporting them into the realm of Ancient Greece. In the 19th and 20th centuries the British system of indirect rule in both East Africa and Nigeria, for example, relied on the creation of an African, continental narrative designed to facilitate the colonial project and legitimate British rule. In 19th century Yorubaland, in East Nigeria, British colonial administrators reinfused an old social cleavage along ancestral city lines with new political meaning. And they reestablished traditional kings, in the interest of creating an aura of legitimacy for the social order they were shaping and, in the interest of efficiency, hoping to rule indirectly. During the interwar period British colonial administrators invented in Tanganyika a largely fictitious narrative of Africa’s past, culture and social structure. They sought to co-opt some social sectors of the colonized population in the hope of bolstering Britain’s position, then weakened by an ideological crisis of Britain’s ‘civilizing mission’ after World War I and confronting widespread resistance. In the interest of continued British colonial rule a group of civil servants, missionaries and social scientists contributed to the creation of an ideology of ‘Africanity’.

In contrast, told from an African perspective, the history of African civilization unfolded in five phases. In its earliest phase North Africa was constructed as part of the European world, leaving southern Africa as a barbaric and “dark” continent. While “black” was a descriptive category in “Sudan,” meaning ‘the Black ones,’ in European and Arab usage that term was judgmental and pejorative. In the second phase Africa was shaped, to the North, through its interaction with Semitic peoples (Phoenicians and Hebrews) and classical Greece and Rome and, to the East, at the Horn of Africa, through its interaction with Black

13 Jackson 1970.
Semites such as the Amhara and the peoples of Eritrea and Ethiopia. The third period was marked by the spread of Islam in Africa. The earliest Muslims facing persecution in Mecca fled across the Red Sea to seek refuge in Ethiopia. East Africa subsequently developed a dynamic Swahili mercantile civilization linking Africa to Asia.\textsuperscript{17} West Africa, well before European colonization, evolved also at the intersection of two civilizations, indigenous Africanity and Islam. The city of Timbuktu became the most celebrated intellectual achievement in the Black world. In the fourth phase Africa emerged as a product of the dialogue between three civilizations –Africanity, Islam and the West. And in the fifth and final phase Africa is now seen as the historical origin of the human species. Afrocentricity has replaced the idea of a triple civilizational heritage. Afrocentricity is a perspective that is both putting Africa in a global context and looking at the history of the world from the perspective of Africa. Because the human species had its origin in Africa, humankind can now be conceived of as one global African diaspora.

With a singular lack of good intentions, Europeans did a great deal to Africanize Africa, for example, through their cartography which created a space for territorial imagination, and through their racism which created a feeling of fellowship among many Africans.\textsuperscript{18} The slave trade tied Africa indelibly to the Americas. Today one out of five people of African ancestry live in North America and the Caribbean. If America is a concept that incites the imagination because of what it promises for the future, Africa incites because of what it recalls from the past. And African contestations over its past are as vibrant as those in the West.

\textit{Pluralist Civilizations in a Global Ecumene, not Unitary Civilizations in the International State System.} The plurality and pluralism of civilizations helps us avoid being trapped by the illusion of singularity.\textsuperscript{19} There are two basic views on civilization. This book takes a pluralist view of civilizations that are embedded in a global ecumene. This ecumene describes universal systems of knowledgeable practices characteristic of multiple modernities rather than a competitive international state system reinforcing civilizational unity. Language and culture are highly consequential; literary and religious traditions are at the center of civilizational complexes. The movement of peoples, back and forth between hills and valleys and across continents and oceans, as well as the tensions within and between religious and literary traditions, account for the pluralism of civilizations.

An alternative view of civilizations holds that they are unitary cultural programs, organized hierarchically around uncontested core values that yield unambiguous criteria for judging good conduct. This view was a European invention of the 18\textsuperscript{th} century. In the 19\textsuperscript{th} century it was enshrined in one standard of civilization. That standard was grounded in race, ethnic affiliation, religion, and a firm belief in the superiority of European civilization over all others. The distinction between civilized and uncivilized

\textsuperscript{17} Middleton 1992.

\textsuperscript{18} Mazrui 2005, 74-75, 77.

\textsuperscript{19} I am restating here some of the main arguments and themes first published in Katzenstein 2010a and 2010b.
peoples is not specific to the European past. It enjoys broad support today among many conservative supporters of Huntington’s thesis of the clash of civilizations – a book that was translated into 39 languages.\textsuperscript{20} Paradoxically it is also held by many liberals who are committed to improving the rule of law and global standards of good governance. Furthermore, the unitary argument is widely used by non-Europeans in their analysis of civilizational politics. Everywhere and at all times, barbarians have knocked on the doors of civilizations.\textsuperscript{21}

All civilizations experience conflicts over contested truths. If and where they appear to cohere around core values these are imaginative innovations created for particular purposes rather than inherent cultural traits of unchanging collective identities and practices. What drives civilizational politics are conflicts over contested truths that reflect internal pluralism and external context. In contrast to this pluralist view, Samuel Huntington’s \textit{Clash of Civilizations} restates the old, unitary thesis for our times. For Huntington, civilizations are coherent, consensual, invariant, and equipped with a state-like capacity to act. Huntington succeeded brilliantly in his objective of providing a new paradigm for looking at world politics after the end of the Cold War. His correct anticipation of 9/11 gave the book a claim to validity that helps account for its continued relevance. Less noticed in public than in academic discourse is the fact that Huntington greatly overstates his case. Numerous analyses have established beyond any reasonable doubt that clashes occur primarily within rather than between civilizations.\textsuperscript{22} Furthermore, the book’s appeal has not been undermined by the failure of the second of its two main claims. Since the end of the Cold War, the relations between Sinic and American civilizations are summarized best by terms such as encounter or engagement rather than clash.

A very similar, anti-Western counter-discourse, also steeped in Western reasoning, has existed for a long time also in Asia. Lee Kuan Yew and his advisor Tommy Koh are outspoken champions of the Asian value view that is common in Singapore.\textsuperscript{23} Another well-known public intellectual in Singapore, Kishore Mahbubani, is a champion of Asia. His recent book details a seismic shift in power from ‘West’ to ‘East.’\textsuperscript{24} And then there is the dialogue between Mohammad Mahathir and Shintarō Ishihara which develops the same point more stridently.\textsuperscript{25} The voices proclaiming the dawn of Asia’s civilizational

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{20} Huntington’s publisher signed 57 foreign contracts. Information provided by Valerie Borchardt, December 1, 2009, personal communication.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Callahan 2010, Pocock 2005, Brody 2001.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Fox 2001; Ben-Yehuda 2003; Chiozza 2002; Henderson and Tucker 2001; Russett, Oneal, and Cox 2000. Neumayer and Plümper 2009. Schimmelfennig 2003, 150.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Zakaria 1994. Koh, Yeo and Latif 2000.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Mahbubani 2008.
\item \textsuperscript{25} Mahathir and Ishihara 1995.
\end{itemize}
primacy may shift from yesterday’s Japan, to today’s China and tomorrow’s India. But these voices are growing louder. Like “Orientalism,” “Occidentalism” characterizes East and West in the singular.

Global Ecumene and Balance of Practice, not International Anarchy and Balance of Power. The internal pluralism of civilizations is reinforced by a larger context in which they are embedded. That context is not the international system or global markets, frequently deployed concepts that suffer from excessive sparseness and abstraction. Recognition of the importance of this global ecumene is central to the trenchant self-critique that William McNeill wrote of his own brilliant book The Rise of the West, more than a quarter of a century after he had completed it and six years before the publication of Huntington’s book. 26 For McNeill, civilizations are internally variegated, loosely coupled, elite-centered social systems that are integrated in a commonly shared global context. He argues that his earlier path-breaking book was wrongheaded. It was based on the faulty assumption of the existence of civilizations conceived as separate groupings whose interaction was the main engine of world history. Instead, McNeill insists now that an adequate account must give proper consideration to the broader context in which all civilizations are embedded. Since civilizations are internally differentiated, they transplant selectively. And since they are loosely integrated, they generate debates and contestations that tend to make them salient to others. What historically was true for South Asia and the Islamic world, under the impact of modern communications technologies is even more true for all contemporary civilizations. A global ecumene pluralizes civilizations within a loose sense of shared values.

Such a pluralist conceptualization of civilization is attuned to the emergence of new cultural and political forces that reflects on the richness of the politically available repertoires of different civilizations. Analysis of pluralist civilizations stresses the balance of human practices and public policies. Shifting balances are producing and reproducing behavioral and symbolic boundaries within and between civilizations that are more or less closely tied to political power.

This pluralist and ecumenical view differs starkly from Samuel Huntington’s unitary conception of civilization. His civilizations are operating in an international system rather than a global ecumene. Hence, Huntington articulates as a policy maxim “the commonalities rule,” pointing as an urgent need to something that exists already in abundance: the search for values, institutions, and practices that are shared across civilizations. 27 In his view, civilizations balance power rather than reflecting open-ended processes and a broad range of human practices. Neglecting all the evidence of a restless, pluralist and at times seething West, Huntington’s analysis sees the West as a civilizational reactive status quo power that reluctantly engages the upsurge of revisionist non-Western civilizations. Rather than focusing on actors such as states, polities, or empires that are embedded in civilizational complexes, in Huntington’s analysis civilizations themselves become actors. And, implausibly, he measures civilizational power solely by material capabilities such as population, GNP, and military expenditures. His clash of civilizations thus looks remarkably similar to a clash of large states or empires.


States, Polities, Empires. Civilizations are not political entities in and of themselves. Instead, they provide a social context and world view that contains various types of political actors, among them states, polities, and empires. The international standing of these actors is determined by the perceived credibility of their current power and prestige, the perceived salience of their active historical memory, and the appeal of their imagined future. If credibility, salience and appeal are widely acknowledged to be politically authentic, civilizational states, polities and empires are politically consequential. In China, historically the state was central and provided a template that Korea, Japan, and Vietnam adopted in organizing their own states. In contemporary China, the state remains central but does not control a far-flung diaspora which is indisputably part of Chinese civilization. In Japan’s civilization the familial state is central. And in contemporary India the state matters; but historically, Indian civilization has flowered and prevailed surreptitiously and over long periods and distances without taking any explicitly political, let alone statist form.

States are centers of political authority with distinct identities and institutions, and endowed with the capacity of collectively mobilizing resources in the achievement of political objectives. States are not the only such centers of authority. Far from being unitary, states take on very different forms. Their hallmark, centralized-territorial rule, persists today in many parts of the world, not unchallenged, but as part of overlapping and intersecting networks of rules in which states, often but by no means always, hold a preeminent position. States are often nested in such broader structures of authority, both older ones like historical empires and newer ones like emerging polities or governance structures. And the degree of “stateness” is variable. Some states, such as Japan, can draw on broader and deeper sources of state power than others such as India. And China’s state power differs depending on whether we conceive of China in territorial terms as the PRC or as a combination of both the territorial state of China and the networks that connect that state to a far-flung Chinese diaspora. Historically, the triumph of the European state over alternative forms of political organization was based on the state’s superior record of keeping peace at home, securing property rights in markets, collecting taxes, organizing a common defense, and waging war. Today, at the European level, stateness remains low in the case of Europe’s emerging multi-level polity. And it does not exist in the case of global Islam.28

Polities are a second type of civilizational actor. They are broader centers of authority that are not exclusively territorially based. Michael Mann sees a world with complex changes that make states in some parts of the world lose control over some political domains while gaining control over others as the need for increasing regulation of human affairs intensifies.29 In Mann’s view, states are becoming increasingly polymorphous and crystallize in multiple forms; they do not exist as singular actors. For example, at the regional level a multi-tiered European polity is in the process of becoming that complements states engaged in the process of a partial pooling of sovereignty.

---

28 Pasha 2007, 62.
John Meyer and his colleagues and students have developed systematically the idea of one global polity which provides cognitive and normative models that help constitute contemporary states.\(^{30}\) Such models provide contemporary states with universal rules in which to ground their claims to legitimacy. As was true of nineteenth century America, far from producing anarchy, political conformity is being generated by the reliance on common cultural material such as law, science, civic associations, religious sects, and nationalism. The global polity acts like a consultant for many different political actors and for the most part produces talk that is addressed primarily to constituent states and influences the goals they set (social and economic development as well as welfare, justice, rights, and equality). Indeed, “it becomes rational rather than treasonous to propose copying policies and structures that appear to be successful in a virtuous or dominant competitor.”\(^{31}\)

Besides states and polities, empire is a third actor in world politics. European empires exported state institutions to other parts of the world where they provided an overlay to indigenous political forms of organization and loyalty, which eventually nested within the institutional import from Europe. Numerous social, economic, and cultural developments in world politics have empowered non-state actors and made citizens more critical consumers of the public goods that states and non-state actors continue to provide.

In contemporary world politics, the American imperium is the closest analogue to empire. Imperium combines traditional elements of old-fashioned European imperialism with elements of rule that are distinctively new.\(^{32}\) The system of far-flung military bases and the power of the American military illustrate the importance of the territorial-military aspects of America’s imperium. At the same time, the United States is also a central actor and part of a system that is creating new forms of non-territorial rule, for example in the evolution of governing mechanisms or in the standards that help define the evolution of consumer society and definitions of individual happiness and contentment.

This categorization among states, polities, and empires is not iron-clad. Actors often inhabit overlapping spaces. This is true of the United States, which is both a state and an imperium. It is true of European states, which are pooling some of their sovereignty in Europe’s emerging polity. And it is also arguably true of China which is in the midst of transforming a civilization into a nation-state.\(^{33}\)

2. Many Wests

Winston Churchill is proof of a West often full of internal contradictions. When, as a Lieutenant, he stepped in front of a ballroom crowd in the Waldorf Astoria eager to hear about the Boer war, he was


\(^{32}\) Katzenstein 2005: 2–6.

\(^{33}\) Xu 2009.
introduced by Mark Twain, no friend of Britain’s or America’s imperialist exploits in Africa or against Spain: “We have always been kin: kin in blood, kin in religion, kin in representative government, kin in ideals, kin in just and lofty purposes; and now we are kin in sin, the harmony is complete, the blend is perfect, like Mr. Churchill himself.”

It was Churchill the racist who actively participated in and supported ethnic cleansing, gas warfare, and vast detention camps in the Third World. And it was Churchill who hated Gandhi, India and all Indians, illustrated by his venomous commentary during the great 1943 famine in Bengal which was caused largely by the mismanagement of Britain then under Churchill’s leadership.

This was Churchill’s first face. His second was the fearless and eloquent leader of Britain and the West, the man who defeated Hitler and the Nazis. At the dawn of the Cold War, Churchill argued in his Fulton, Missouri speech: “Americans and British must never cease to proclaim in fearless tones the great principles of freedom and the rights of man which are the join inheritance of the English-speaking world and which through Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, habeas corpus, trials by jury and the English common law find their most famous expression in the American Declaration of Independence.”

For Churchill and his intellectual followers the English-speaking peoples are the specific manifestations of Anglo-America and the loftiest representation of the West.

This unitary conception still enjoys some currency today, especially in some conservative political quarters. The “special partnership” between Britain and the United States was in evidence in the first decade of the 21st century. During the run-up to the attack on Iraq Prime Minister Blair was the U.S.’s most important comrade-in-arms, ready to pay the “blood price.” In 2007 President Bush called the ties between the United States and Britain the “most important bilateral relationship ... primarily because we think the same, we believe in freedom and justice as fundamentals of life.”

And Gordon Brown’s visit of the United States in March 2009 was explicitly designed to revitalize the special relationship tarnished by an unpopular war and American high-handedness.

Yet the White House this time around invoked a “special partnership” rather than a “special relationship” which raised eyebrows in London. President Obama had written at length about his grandfather’s claims of having been tortured by British soldiers in Keny; and he had the bust of Winston Churchill removed from the Oval Office and returned to Britain. Prime Minister David Cameron acknowledged new political conditions during his first visit to Washington DC after he had become

---

34 The Economist 2008a, 71.
36 The Economist 2004, 39.
38 The Economist 2008b, 66.
39 The Economist 2008a, 71.
40 Burns 2009.
Prime Minister in 2010. Undermining the notion of Britain as America’s Trojan poodle, Cameron sought to replace misty-eyed emotion with hard-nosed national interest in a “partnership of choice” as the foundation of Britain’s special relation with the United States.41

“The West” is often referred to in the singular as a civilizational complex that differs from “the East.” This is implausible. Conceived as unities East and West are inaccurate labels that offer a profoundly misleading view of the world. More specific regional designations such as “Europe” or “Asia” are beset by similar problems, although they at least invite questions about demarcations that can undermine their persuasiveness. Europeans find themselves in fundamental disagreement whether Russia or Turkey are part of Europe. And the concept of Asia, in the singular, makes no sense in trying to impose a unity on South-, Southeast- and East Asia that simply does not exist for the peoples living in these disparate parts of the world -- except in the powerful imagination of popular pundits and Pan-Asian political theorists. The story is no different when we talk about the West. In the singular it does not exist and needs to be replaced by the idea of many Wests that exist often in contradiction with one another.

Maps representing civilizations in single colors suggest a social homogeneity that is misleading compared to more complex visual representations.42 Focusing specifically on the writings of Samuel Huntington, Louis Hartz and James Bennett I have argued in chapter 1 the case for pluralist and plural notions of Anglo-America. The substantive chapters in this book, furthermore, have illustrated great variations in what we mean by Anglo-America and what the politics of Anglo-America look like in practice. A century ago Anglo-America served the purpose of a liberalism suffused by racism and imperialism. A century later, across the various parts of Anglo-America we are now witnessing the democratic politics of multi-racialism, embryonic triculturalism, and opaque multiculturalism. In the 19th century it was widely believed that there existed only one Anglo-American standard of civilization.43 That idea has lost much of its credibility in a multicivilizational world evolving along plural and pluralist lines.

Besides Anglo America there exists a second conception of the West, as in the New World of the Americas. Building on the work of Arthur P. Whitaker, Arturo Santa-Cruz delineates the Western Hemispheric Idea as a distinct sphere of communication, interaction and interest that constitute what is considered legitimate in politics.44 Ever since Jefferson, the idea that there is a specific pattern of interaction, and not necessarily cooperation, has grown around the notion that the new world is different from the old. Over time the internal division of the Western Hemisphere diminished, illustrated by the Pan-American movement. In the late 19th century the modern Inter-American system, starting with the Washington Conference of 1889, dates back to the very moment at which US interventions in Central America and the rise of anti-Yankee feelings were on the upswing. Tensions and disagreements

41 Economist 2010a.
44 Whitaker 1954. Santa-Cruz 2005, 6-8,17-18,34-42. See also Jones 2007.
about the normative order of the American version of the West did not abate until President Roosevelt initiated the “Good Neighbor Policy” in 1936, with the U.S. accepting unconditionally the principle of non-intervention. At that time the U.S. affirmed with all its partners in the Americas the commitment to democracy, peace and justice. The self-proclaimed distinctiveness from Europe thus had given way to an expression of a shared solidarity based on the principles of representative democracy, expressed subsequently in the Bogota Charter as the founding document of the Organization of American States in 1948. The Western Hemispheric Idea as a distinct version of the West thus is based on the principle of rights-based representative government (supported most forcefully by the U.S.) and non-intervention (supported by the states of Latin and Central America afraid of the U.S.), with both principles informing but not determining political practices which often deviated from these lofty ideals.

Shmuel Eisenstadt and Jeremy Smith have offered complementary arguments of the Americas that reconfirm and illuminate the idea of many Wests from a more explicitly civilizational perspective. As the point of departure, both reject out-of-hand Louis Hartz’s Euro-centric theory that the Americas were “frozen fragments” of Europe. European patterns were instead radically transformed in the process of transplantation from the Old world to the New. Like Santa-Cruz, Eisenstadt’s comparative analysis stresses both commonalities and differences of American civilization. Most important, he argues, is the relative weakness of primordial criteria such as language and territory. Instead new collective identities emerged among the settlers, imbued by a universalist ethos in the United States and a formal hierarchical ethos in Latin America. The principles of social order offered mirror images of each other: equality, achievement, and transient, reformist protest orientations prevailing in the British North, and clientelism, ascriptive social status, and cyclical, radical protest in the Hispanic South. In their relationship with the old European world the two American variants were not clashing as much as they were undergoing divergent processes of self-differentiation from kindred European societies. Transplanted to the Americas the impulses of the Reformation and Counter-reformation were affected deeply by what British and Hispanic settlers shared: the experience of European colonialism and the confrontation with indigenous populations. Smith disaggregates American civilization further by analyzing distinctive Canadian and Caribbean variants that Eisenstadt bypasses and by adding America’s indigenous civilizations and perhaps the American South as further variants to the concept of a manifold West.

Finally there exists the enduring debate about the relations between Europe and America. Even in moments of externally induced crisis and in times of change, the two are viewed as distinct though deeply related. For example, President Kennedy’s speech, delivered in Philadelphia on July 4, 1962, invoked a transatlantic partnership founded on a new declaration of interdependence between the

45 Hartz 1964.
46 Eisenstadt 2002b.
47 Smith 2010. In addition he emphasizes that cross- civilizational engagements is a central category for comprehending the dynamism of the multiple Americas.
United States and Europe. Competing American and French universalisms also illustrate the existence of a plural and pluralist West. The core values motivating the French revolution — *liberté, égalité, fraternité* — remain of utmost importance to France’s sense of self and the projection of that self, through language and institutions, in the world, particularly in Africa.\(^{48}\) Republican values, French officials hoped, would secure French influence in its “special relation” with Africa even after decolonization. Lacking the resources necessary for pursuing its self-proclaimed universalist *mission civilisatrice* during the Cold War Sub-Saharan Africa in particular acquired great civilizational significance for France. Ever the political realist De Gaulle cut the links to North Africa early in the Fifth Republic. But he saw France’s *grandeur* deeply enmeshed with Black Africa. Africa was thus an essential external ingredient to the universalist Western values embodied in the French revolution.\(^{49}\) For decades French officials constantly feared increasing American (and Soviet) influence in what they regarded as an exclusively French African sphere of influence. This was only one of many deep-seated sources of French anti-Americanisms.\(^{50}\) It finds its American analogue in the periodic outbursts of anti-French sentiments, as in the renaming of French fries into freedom fries on the menu of the cafeteria of the U.S. Congress at the height of the crisis over the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. Disregarding the civilizational variants they contain, the following two sections analyze America and Europe as the two most important manifestations of the West.

### 3. Civilizational Identities: America and Europe

Unitary and single tradition theories do not help us understand accurately either the West or Anglo-America. At the same time the concept of the West continues to receive support from the use by “outsiders” who invoke the concept in complex ways to construct their own identity and thus prolong the existence of the West as a unitary category.\(^{51}\) But not always. Although like others Chinese civilizational discourses deploy the concept of “barbarian,” the Chinese concept of all-under-heaven lacks the notion of the “other.”\(^{52}\) Chinese thinkers thus focus on self-rectification to create the best approximation of what it means to be Chinese in world politics. The West is thus an unstable category.

---


\(^{49}\) Tensions between assimilation and association were a constant in France’s relations with Africa. They were mediated by the acceptance of a tiny portion of the African elite into French society. In general though the principle of human rights based on racial equality embedded in the core values France held dear clashed plainly and painfully with French racist discourses, practices and policies. See Stovall and Van den Abbeele 2003 and Peabody and Stovall 2003. Whatever their other differences, on this point the similarity between French and Anglo-American incarnations of the West are striking.


\(^{51}\) Browning and Lehti 2010a, 5.

\(^{52}\) Shih 2010.
K.M. Heller argues the unitary West is an ideal type that “gathers an imaginary geography, geopolitical being, an historical destiny, and a commitment to a unique set of values . . . Naming something Western thus tends to take the form, however truncated, of a theory of the world-historical.”

**Primordiality as Social Construction.** We should therefore understand the wide-spread use of the West, in the singular, as a discursive civilizational category with actor-like dispositions deployed under specific political conditions and for specific political purposes. It is not the category, but the act of reification or construction that is politically consequential and that requires political analysis. In convincing ourselves and others of a specific mental map, and aligning our identities and interests with that map, we rely on rhetorical constructions to impute meaning that otherwise eludes us. For empirically inclined scholars who prefer to work eclectically, primordiality offers a plausible addition to discursive and dispositional approaches.

Primordiality is a crystallization of social consciousness that is simplifying. It can focus on civilization as it does on gender, kinship, territory, language, or race. The specific collective identity invoked is defined either in terms of “civility” (drawing boundaries between “us” and “them” with a specific focus on rules of conduct and social routines) or in terms of sacredness (drawing boundaries between “us” and “them” with specific reference to the transcendental, defined as God or Reason). A conceptual middle ground from which to deploy, as the evidence may require, either dispositional or discursive or both styles of analysis has much appeal. We need to understand both how civilizations become, and what they are. For, as Yale Ferguson points out, there appears to exist a sufficiently wide and deep consensus about the very term of civilization. Indeed, in primordial constructions of self and other, dispositional and discursive analysis are probably deeply entangled with one another rather than existing side by side.

Civilizations are nesting or nested in other cultural entities and processes. Syncretism, for example, shows one form of politics in which civilizational, religious, and national sentiments meet. Deeply meaningful to many members of the cultural elite, as self-conscious and lived identities, civilizations do not rank at the top for most people and typically do not manifest themselves in an everyday sense of strong belonging. Making civilizations primordial is a political project that aims at creating a taken-for-granted sense of reality that helps in distinguishing between self and other and right and wrong. It requires elimination of the awareness that civilizations are multiple traditions of religious, philosophical, and scientific ideas, and that they are reflected in multiple processes and practices.

**America.** One of the characteristic aspects of civilizational identities is the blending of civilizational with national sentiments. Michael Lind, for example, makes a compelling case for the United States, which he

---

54 See also Katzenstein 2010a, 11-13.
57 Haas 2000.
calls America, as consisting of different strands of nationalisms, left-wing multiculturalism, right-wing democratic universalism, and centrist liberal (stressing language culture) or populist nativist (stressing race or religion) nationalism. Both multiculturalism and democratic universalism contain elements of cultural-racial and political-constitutional universalisms that tinge the civilization of modernity which embeds the West and other civilizations. But they also contain strands of American exceptionalism celebrating America’s “Obama-nation” as the most successful racial and ethnic melting pot the world has ever seen as well as the incarnation of democratic institutions that are morally superior to all others. These two visions, Lind argues “have almost monopolized recent discussions ...[and] agree that the United States has never been a conventional nation-state.”

Lind disagrees with this assessment as he builds his case for a liberal nationalism that blends heterogeneous subcultures and political and religious dogma into a concrete historical community defined by a common language, folkways, and a vernacular culture. But it is peculiar that American nationalism “is almost never represented in public discussions of American identity,” and is dominated instead by ideas expressing important civilizational notions, such as the American way of life, not to the exclusion of national sentiments but as quintessential components of American collective identity. The historical mutations of America’s collective identity from Anglo-Saxon (1789-1861), to Euro-American (1875-1957), and Multicultural (1972 to the present) put the basic building blocks of race, culture and citizenship in different configurations with a successive broadening and blending of racial, religious and ethno-cultural boundaries of exclusion. Considering the intensity of conflicts over its history, and on the evidence of the opaque multiculturalism that marks Anglo-America as discussed in this book, it is unlikely that the image of a cosmopolitan liberal “Trans-America” will ever come to pass. If it were, however, it would overcome, finally, the divisions between multicultural liberalism and plutocratic conservatism and offer its own distinctive blending of civilizational-national identities that are color-blind, gender-neutral and express a strong commitment to individual rights and socio-economic equality.

In his analysis of democracy in America Tocqueville offers an analysis of one national experience in light of the broader civilization to which it belongs, with specific attention paid to the shift from aristocracy to democracy unfolding throughout the West in the 19th century. To view America as being endowed with one central set of values is empirically questionable. In the area of foreign policy, for example, America has numerous traditions. The most recent reassertion of Jacksonianism under the Presidency of G. W. Bush must be seen against the background of other foreign policy traditions, such as Jeffersonian,

60 Lind 2006, 6.
61 Moreau 2003.
63 Swedberg 2007, 9.
64 Mead 2002.
Hamiltonian and Wilsonian. And until the middle of the 20th century one of these traditions was racist which was still visible in the different approaches the United States took to the construction of NATO and SEATO in the late 1940s.\textsuperscript{65}

Woodrow Wilson exemplifies America’s multiple traditions.\textsuperscript{66} Wilson was both a man of the South who was a consistent advocate of racial difference, in both domestic and international affairs. In Asia he is best known for his veto of the racial equality clause at the Versailles peace conference at the end of World War I. As Stephen Skowronek argues, as politician and statesman Wilson was consistent. His racial ideas made him rework received ideals and promulgate principles now associated with liberal democracy.\textsuperscript{67}

Wilson was a strong opponent of Congressional despotism over the South which, he believed, made a travesty of the doctrine of states rights. The South, he believed, should have a right to self-determination, in effect sanctioning the rule of the Klu Klux Klan. Since the system of institutional checks and balances had been overturned, Wilson became an advocate for strong Presidential leadership based on direct popular appeal. Internationally too Wilson favored an activist foreign policy and the spreading of American values. But he was less interested in the universal application of his doctrine than in getting great powers to agree on stabilizing compacts. Since Wilson saw the League of Nations as a conservative force, many Republicans in the Senate opposed his policy. They feared that in a refurbished Concert of the Great Powers system the U.S. might strengthen the forces of repression rather than act as a force of liberation.

Wilson and Wilsonianism took more than a page from Edmund Burke’s insistence on the centrality of organic evolution over contrived constitutional principles. In the US, lacking a proper system of checks and balances and operating under the rule of a strong President, political self-restraint was the most important virtue. Abstract plans were less important than established norms and habits and the functioning of a contentious pluralism. Hence Wilson resisted the leveling tendencies of concentrated power and opposed women suffrage. Similarly in international affairs Wilson made Burke’s criticism of Britain’s ruling rule in India his own. And since he held firmly to an organic view of progress toward independence -- in which the more civilized can help the less civilized to accelerate their journey toward eventual self-rule -- Wilson could support America’s tutelary empire in the Philippines just as much as the South’s tutelary rule over black Americans. Collective security was not static, as the balance of power, but organic and evolutionary. Thus Wilson supported both, the mandate system and a system of constraining war in Europe.

Anatol Lieven argues that America’s journey from “Herrenvolk democracy” to “civilizational empire” required shedding the tradition of overt racism that characterized America’s first Wilsonian phase at the


\textsuperscript{66} The next three paragraphs are reproduced from Katzenstein 2010b.

\textsuperscript{67} Skowronek 2006.
outset of the 20th century. At the end of World War II, under the experience of the Holocaust and at the dawn of the decolonization movement, American leaders made a significant break with the America’s deeply entrenched racist legacy between the late 1940s and mid-1960s. Over the next decades this shift has been embraced widely. And it has transformed the political role of the South as the pivotal region for different Left-of-Center and Right-of-Center internationalist strategies. America’s civilizational empire thus is not merely a military empire steeped in racist doctrine, as was true to different degrees of the Mongolian continental and European maritime empires. Instead it follows closer to the tradition of Isalmic and Sinic civilizational empires and perhaps also of the Roman empire after it granted full citizenship to all its free subjects in A.D. 221.

The new politics of race point to analogous developments in some of America’s other multiple traditions and their influence on America’s civilizational empire that I can mention here only briefly. One of those developments is the strong impulse of America’s religious fundamentalism on faith-based, human rights diplomacy, complementing the secular human rights movement. Similarly, since the beginning of the republic, economic liberalism has both battled intensely and lived symbiotically with economic protectionism in an unending contest between competing political ideologies and traditions with a strong sectional base. At home, America’s multiple and dueling traditions find expression in sectional and partisan coalitions and the institutions which emerge from the victory of different coalitions over time. Abroad they have helped create processes of Americanization that have helped shape profoundly contemporary world affairs.

In his genealogical account of the history of the West James Kurth tracks successive Classical, Christian, and Western phases that merge into a contemporary global civilization. The American roots in the Reform Protestantism of English Puritans and Scottish Presbyterians as well as the British Enlightenment created a distinct off-shoot that differed from developments on the European continent and made it a genuine alternative to 19th century European conceptions of Western civilization. American political development was supportive of furthering rule by contract and constitution, defining institutions of liberal democracy and market capitalism. Crystallized as the American creed it has had a profound influence on the emerging global civilization without, however, fully imprinting it. Ruthless Americanization of successive waves of immigrants at home, and, with the decline of the European great powers, responsible international leadership abroad were both parts of this process. The unity of the American nation-state and the Western alliance that marked the global confrontation with Fascism and Communism in the 20th century is now giving way to new political coalitions and developments: a new multicultural regime inside America erected on the fragments of a now defunct American Creed and the

68 Lieven 2004, 41-47.
70 Trubowitz 1998.
71 Kurth 2010.
establishment of a new global civilization supportive of individual human rights and unfettered global markets.

One implication of the centrality of America’s multiple traditions and the political conflicts they have engendered, is to let go of the cherished myth of American exceptionalism. It makes more sense to underline instead American distinctiveness especially when viewed comparatively and placed in a global context. America is not cut from one cloth. It is constituted instead by different traditions – liberal and illiberal, secular and religious. In the distant past it was the toleration of religious differences that was a critically important preconditions for America’s ascendance in global politics. Today the move to greater ethnic and racial tolerance has coincided with America reaching a position of global preeminence after 1945.

*Europe.* Although in a very different political context, a similar blending of civilizational and national identities is also characteristic of European identities. As an emerging multilevel polity the EU attracts some political allegiance – strongly from Europe’s elites, and weakly from Europe’s mass publics. But these expressions of political allegiance are typically complementing rather than replacing existing and vibrant national sentiments. Most Europeans feel themselves to members of both their national communities and of Europe. In contrast to national sentiments dying for Europe is not an issue for the average European. Not killing Europeans is. But there is rarely ever any doubt that the primary locus of identification is national rather than European. And European sentiments are more often instrumental than emotional.

Viewed against the backdrop of persistent strong national identification, the increasing politicization of identities in the process of European enlargement has created two very different European identity projects – one outward looking and cosmopolitan, the other inward-looking and national-populist. Cosmopolitan conceptions are driven by elite level politics, reflect the winners of market liberalization and integration, and focus on political citizenship and rights. Populist conceptions respond to mass politics, reflect the losers of economic liberalization and integration, and are concerned with social citizenship and cultural authenticity. Furthermore, the politicization of religion and religious identities reinforces the politicization of collective identities during the process of European enlargement. Toward the East Christianity or Catholicism are regarded by many Europeans as an intuitively plausible dividing line, crystallized politically in the issue of Turkish accession to the EU. Furthermore, European civil societies try to come to terms with a rapidly growing Muslim minority that itself is divided in its allegiance between Euro-Islam and a global *umma*. At the same time many Europeans also subscribe to the notion of a non-confessional and secular European identity that clashes with a religious fundamentalism defining the extreme, American fringe of Western civilization. In Europe, as in America,

---

72 Lipset 1996.
75 Checkel and Katzenstein 2009b.
civilizational and national identities are thus intermingled. To deny one or the other would simplify unduly the complex reality of a civilizational complex that links America and Europe in a plural and pluralist West.

In the case of Europe it is “the idea of Europe” which provides the uniform veneer for its multiple traditions and the different political practices it entails. Thus Karl Deutsch has argued that medieval Europe was plural.\(^\text{76}\) It featured six separate civilizational strands: monastic Christianity around the Mediterranean; Latin Christendom in Western and Central Europe; and Byzantium in South-eastern Europe. These three major civilizations were connected by the Afro-Eurasian trade networks of Islam which for centuries took hold on the Iberian peninsula, as well as elements of two smaller trading civilizations, Jews and Vikings. Often contemporary European civilization, in the singular, is being written about either in relation to the theme of the uniqueness of the West, or in contradistinction to Islam and the presumed binary between Occident and Orient. Europe’s multiple traditions are invented and constitute important sources for Europe’s collective identities.\(^\text{77}\)

Gerard Delanty, whom I am following here, writes in the opening sentence of his book, “every age reinvented the idea of Europe in the mirror of its own identity.”\(^\text{78}\) Europe is not a self-evident entity but a construction that changes over time and expresses different political processes, practices, and realities. The idea of Europe has quite often been deployed as a unifying cultural frame and a universalizing projection more than the designation of a place. And that projection extends backward to an invented past in which Europe was always a fantasy homeland besieged by external enemies. But such primordial constructions confront stubborn facts on the ground that suggest otherwise. Europe is, by its very nature, a deeply contested concept evoking profoundly ambivalent reactions and often contradictory political impulses. At its core lies the tension between exclusive and inclusive collective identities.\(^\text{79}\) There is no immutable European idea and set of political practices linked indelibly, as many of Europe’s leaders and media elites argue today, to humanist values and liberal democracy. Imperialism and genocide, both inside and outside of Europe, are as much part of the European idea and practice as are its Greco-Roman legacies, Latin Christendom, the Renaissance, and the Enlightenment. Europe’s traditions have encompassed both integrating and unifying ideas and practices as well as internal and external divisions.

Europe incorporates more than one civilizational constellation. The Orthodox and Islamic parts of Europe make Gerard Delanty, with explicit reference to Eisenstadt, talk of contemporary Europe as three civilizational constellations.\(^\text{80}\) In an era of cultural pluralization Europe has three religious

---

\(^\text{76}\) This paragraph is adapted from Katzenstein 2010b. Deutsch 1944.

\(^\text{77}\) Hobsbawm 1983.

\(^\text{78}\) Delanty 1995, 1. 2003, 2006b.

\(^\text{79}\) Checkel and Katzenstein 2009a.

\(^\text{80}\) Delanty 2003, 14-19.
communities and traditions which exhibit in their variegated practices both political contradictions and convergences. In a longer historical perspective Europe is more than the result of its Graeco-Roman legacy. That historical understanding overlooks the intermingling of Greek with Jewish and Phoenician cultures at the outset of the European odyssey. And it neglects the fact that other parts of Europe’s civilizational constellations, located further to the East, came to cultural rationalization later and perhaps were less open to it. In the form of Communism and Republicanism, Eastern European states imposed Western European forms of political rationalization on agrarian and religious populations, in the case of Russia accompanied by a social revolution and in the case of Turkey without. Three different civilizations thus are constituting Europe and European practices. And Europe has three distinct traditions from which competing conceptions of collective identity and political practice are drawn.

Europe is becoming more open, especially on its Eastern border. It is moving, in the words of Gerard Delanty, from postnationality to a potentially transformative encounter with Russian-Orthodox and Ottoman-Islam civilizations.\(^1\) Enlargement is not just about Europe growing bigger. It is also about Europe’s reconfiguration, rooted in a civilizational encounter with its suppressed or forgotten parts. Today the consequences of encounter are far from clear. They may consolidate a European identity defined more clearly against “the other” in the East. Or they may redefine Europe’s social purpose and common laws while giving space to a looser sense of cultural association where issues of immigration and security take center stage. Undoubtedly religious diversity will increase with the incorporation of two additional religious communities.\(^2\) Political friction is likely to increase also as the European periphery resists and seeks to redefine Europe’s core.\(^3\) But the battle lines are much less clearly drawn than they were more than three centuries ago at the gates of Vienna.

Europe is a political model that differs from the United States. Emanuel Adler dissents both from an America-centric view of the West, and the view of the emergence of a new global civilization stamped in America’s image.\(^4\) In the United States militarism and multiculturalism are locked in an unresolved domestic conflict that leaves the American influence on the emerging global civilization in question. Under the impact of a catastrophic Thirty Years war that started in 1914 and ended in 1945, since the middle of the 20th century Europe meanwhile has shed its militarist legacy. European civilization is in the midst of profound change. It is the first civilization, Adler argues, that has reinvented itself as a postmodern security community. This European civilization is developing novel practices that sidestep and seek to overcome the traditional power politics found, for example, in American and Islamic civilizations. This, not Huntington’s, is the real clash in today’s civilizational politics played out at a global level between a Europe practicing political self-restraint – in sharp contrast to America and Islam which, for different reasons, are not.

---


\(^{2}\) Katzenstein and Byrnes 2006.

\(^{3}\) Checkel and Katzenstein 2009a.

Dennis Bark also points to the profound differences that stand between Europe and America. These differences are “not of principle but of practice” and “the essential difference between us” is a historical one: Europe was built from the top down, the United States from the bottom up.

Bark makes his essentialist argument in the context of an overarching shared collective identity. Robert Kagan goes further. In the run-up to the Iraq war he and other neo-conservatives favoring the invasion of Iraq, more consistently than Bark contrasted America’s military might and masculinity with Europe’s political pacifism and femininity. Within a few months, as Mars was battered and bloodied in Iraq, Europeans lost little time to articulate more fully the notion of Europe’s civilian and normative power.

Mark Leonard, for example, argues that Europe, far from being weak, wields a new, transformative kind of power, with more than a billion people now living in the European sphere of influence, that transforms itself not by spectacular displays of military power but by laws, regulations, and the attraction of doing things the European way.

That new Europe is also very old. The apostles of power politics in the United States are retraceing the path of Rome by forcefully projecting a unitary conception of sovereignty backed by military might. The new Europe, by contrast, is returning to the Holy Roman empire of segmented sovereignty and consensual decision making in and around networks. At its core this Europe now constitutes a security community marked by predictable expectations of peaceful change and an often self-consciously stylized “other” to the United States. Although American neo-conservatives like Kagan and his European critics differed sharply in their politics, they tended to agree on the underlying assumption that Europe was standing for one set of uncontested values – be it unmanly pacifism or good norms informing an ethical foreign policy. Yet it is plainly wrong to define Europe in terms of a single value or consistent set of norms. “Europe’ cannot really be defined in terms of a single culture at all ... a definition that embraces the whole continent – such as respect for human rights, the rule of law, care for the poor and love of liberty . . . does so only because it is not distinctively European.”

Europe’s normative power thus is rooted in the fact that the new Europe subscribes to the same values as did the old US, and that the new US holds firm to the same values as did old Europe. The simple fact is that Europe and America have switched places as the balance power and contested values has changed over time. For both, Europe and America, contained advocates of the value of power and of weakness.

“Deeply embedded within Western civilization, through some mysterious process bearing providential

---

85 Bark 2007, 2, 4.
89 James 2006, 118-40.
90 Economist 2006.
overtones, Europe has ended up where America began”. This switch was made possible by the existence of multiple traditions that are reflected in multiple civilizational practices.

4. Civilizational Processes and Practices Americanization and Europeanization

Processes that reflect various practices in the civilization of modernity are normally referred to as globalization or internationalization. Globalization describes processes that transcend time and compress space and that have novel and transformative effects on world politics. Internationalization describes processes that refer to territorially based exchanges across national borders and that reflect basic continuities in the evolution of the international state system. Globalization favors convergence around common standards as well as a variety of local adaptations to global change. Internationalization permits continued differences in national practices. The civilization of modernity is marked by a characteristic mixture of transformative global and incremental international effects. Understanding civilizational practices in world politics requires moving from abstract characterizations of global and international processes to more specific ones that reflect the distinctive characteristics of intra- and intercivilizational engagements and encounters.

All civilizational processes have a Janus face. One side describes the process of remaking “other” to be more like “self” either through total assimilation or by making “other” conform more closely to dominant civilizational practices. The other side describes the process by which “other” appropriates aspects of civilizational “self.” While the first process is conceived to be radiating outward from a civilizational center, the second typically refers to the actions of those located in a civilizational periphery. Rather than being forced on others, as in theories of cultural imperialism, civilizational processes are typically self-chosen. Both processes typically occur simultaneously. At one extreme we find processes of diffusion of best civilizational practices that leave actors in the civilizational center unaffected. At the other extreme we see self-reflective actors in the civilizational periphery who recombine and absorb civilizational influences into effective ensembles of routinized practices. Profoundly interactive, two-way processes can have positive and negative consequences for both civilizational center and periphery.

Americanization. Like other civilizational processes, Americanization is a two-way process. It covers a broad range of practices and products through spontaneous diffusion in social networks and markets as well as through planned corporate and state strategies. Contrary to Amy Chua’s argument, Americanization is not only a source of opposition to but also a glue for America’s imperium. On the
North American continent Americanization has had a powerful assimilationist impact that has shown multiple faces – genocidal, socio-cultural, creedal and political. And America’s cultural and economic dynamism coupled in the second half of the 20th century with its military might has helped build a civilizational empire also beyond its borders. Susan Strange once remarked that globalization is nothing but polite party talk for what in fact is a process of Americanization. Perhaps. But in tracing the approximation of the two processes Akira Iriye notes important variations. At the outset of the 20th century Americanization fascinated observers in two ways – the mechanical, physical and material and the spiritual, mental and ethical. Even though the influence of American ideals persisted, during the first half of the 20th century the importance of the material outstripped the ideational. In the second half of the century the temporary conflation of globalization and Americanization was problematic as the Cold War split the world into different parts experiencing Americanization, Sovietization and a surge of Third World nationalism. The geopolitics of the Cold War pushed into the background both the materialist culture and the idealist aspects of the Americanization process. Indeed, Irye argues that the international society of states became less tied to Americanization processes and more to the expanding tasks of international organizations which, over time, ceased to be mere mouthpieces of America’s geostrategic interests. The difference between the two processes was at times a chasm so broad that it could not be bridged -- illustrated by the fact that on a number of salient political issues the United States was repeatedly outvoted in the United Nations by the overwhelming majority of states.

Americanization has a domestic and an international face and refers to a broad range of empirical phenomena spanning economic, social, cultural, political and military affairs. Its domestic face, the process of making foreign influences American, consists of three parts. The first is to make immigrants of different class and ethnic backgrounds American, a contentious process as political conflicts surrounding illegal immigration illustrate. A second part refers to the modularity of American practices. According to John Blair Jr. in 19th century America across a broad range of life (including education, industrial assembly, architecture, music, sports, law, and religion) human practices reveal modular structures. Modularity is an integral part of the process of modernization. It makes it possible, Blair argues, to conceive of organic and predictable wholes in cultural repertoires as the sum total of parts which can be combined and recombined in novel ways. John Kouwenhoven (1956) makes a related argument abstracting from a list that includes the architecture of skyscrapers, the gridiron town plan, Jazz, the Constitution, Mark Twain’s writings and Walt Whitman’s Leaves of Grass. American civilization is about simple and infinitely repeatable units, ceaseless motion, process not product, and open-endedness in time and space. A third part is the Americanization of modernism, of anti-traditional

95 Iriye 2007.
96 Iriye 2007, 30.
99 Kouwenhoven 1956.
movements that established themselves in European art in the late 19th century. It, too, is central to processes of Americanization.\textsuperscript{100}

In its international face Americanization interacts with the world.\textsuperscript{101} Elsewhere I have tracked Americanization empirically in the domains of popular culture, technology and security.\textsuperscript{102} Shopping malls and intellectual currents illustrate the range of American cultural exports and the importance of cross-fertilization. As it co-mingles imports and exports, Americanization exhibits a complex mixture of hierarchical and egalitarian elements. Immigrants brought foods that American ingenuity in mass production and marketing converted to commodities with global appeal. Other products, some harmless such as the cartoon Peanuts, others harmful such as Marlboro cigarettes, succeeded by meeting consumer tastes and needs through marketing the appeal of America the imagined. In popular entertainment, American idioms, often fed by foreign sources, as in the case of rap music, have had energizing effects on other parts of the world. Hollywood’s dream machine is so powerful because American producers have enjoyed an iron grip on worldwide outlets. Yet a majority of America’s major studios are foreign-owned, and many of Hollywood’s major directors are foreign-born. Particular markets, such as children TV, have proven highly receptive to foreign imports. Hollywood is both in America and of the world.

In the area of technology the observable pattern is not cross-fertilization, as in popular culture, but co-evolution. With the exception of some areas of military technology, the era of America’s unquestioned technological supremacy has passed. Instead piecemeal borrowing and selective adaptation is the norm. Americanization, when successful, refers more to the learning capacities of local actors than to the diffusion of standardized American technologies which foreign producers and consumers copy wholesale. Even in the basic sciences Asia and Europe are closing the gap that existed a generation ago. Seattle and Detroit are two cities that illustrate the full range of the economic and political consequences of technological co-evolution.

In sum, like its close cousin Americanism, Americanization refers to widely admired (democratic capitalism, affluent modernity, enlightened tolerance) and widely despised (culturally inferior, superficial, materialist, profit-hungry, religiously zealous) traits.\textsuperscript{103} Whatever the American reality, the American dream has managed to entice the human imagination, ever since the New World was discovered. It offers an idiom to debate both American and non-American concerns. And this capacity to entice is enormously consequential for the political salience of America’s civilizational complex.

\textsuperscript{100} Elteren, 2006, 104, 110.


\textsuperscript{102} Katzenstein 2005, 199-207.

\textsuperscript{103} Kazin and McCartin 2006.
Europeanization. According to Norbert Elias Europe experienced a civilizing process, in the singular.104 But it is also the origin of a multitude of Europeanization processes. Social historian Hartmut Kaelble has mapped a whole series of emerging common European practices, among others in family relations, employment systems, consumption, and urban life.105 Some of these have grown weaker, others stronger. Together they define an ensemble of distinct European practices that have, at least not yet, had a strong effect on a still embryonic European identity.106 In the second half of the 20th century decreasing national differences and increasing European commonalities have also witnessed growing intra-European connections and exchanges in areas such as occupation, education, marriage, consumer and cultural exchanges and growing foreign language competences.

Europeanization also has an external dimension. Historically, the Europeanization of the world has meant the wholesale export of Europe’s institutional patterns and practices.107 Many scholars have developed long inventories of the forms of everyday life and habits, production and consumption, fads and fashions, religion and language, principles and organizational forms that Europe exported. This aspect of Europeanization generated both mutually profitable economic exchange and one-sided exploitation, welcome institutional modernization and unwanted military conquest and occupation. The Old World conquered the New, but only in the case of America did the New win over the Old in permanently shifting not only the balance of practice but also the balance of power. In the most recent past, Europeanization has primarily come to refer to a set of interrelated processes that are directed at and shaping Europe’s emerging multi-level polity. These processes go far beyond traditional intergovernmental bargaining and include also developments in civil society as well as changes in elite and mass identifications.108 Johan Olsen’s trenchant analysis of Europeanization shows that, in contrast to the past, most of the components of contemporary processes of Europeanization are inward looking and are affecting change primarily inside Europe.109

But not all. Having lost its erstwhile hegemony over world affairs European cooperation after 1945 prepared the ground for an unprecedented period of exploration and innovation after the fall of the Berlin Wall. As it seeks to wield more soft and at times even hard power, Europe is challenging established hierarchies in world politics. Exporting its politics through the enlargement of the European

104 Elias 2000.
106 Checkel and Katzenstein 2009a.
107 Gong 1984. Bowden 2009. Koskenniemi 2001. In the English School’s approach international society is the product of Western civilization defined in terms of “an international social consciousness, a worldwide community sentiment” (Wight 1968, 96-97). The core values of that community are Christian notions of natural law which have spread, to different extents, from Europe to all other parts of the world (Krasner 1999, 47-48). See also Bull and Watson 1984 and Watson 1992.
Union is one manifestation of this shift. Changes in the territorial reach of Europe are enlarging also the scope of its rules through a variety of mechanisms, including a normative discourse that has entrapped actors whose interests might otherwise be opposed to enlargement and identities and norms that are invoked sincerely or used instrumentally.¹¹⁰

The export of European models of organization is marked by the interaction between external impulses and internal institutional repertoires and historical memories. The result is rarely the cloning of some aspect of Europe as an external model rather than an adaptation of some parts of the European model so that it fits local conditions. Contemporary Europeanization processes are no longer simply physically coercive. Instead they offer a set of institutions for governance, including the institution of the welfare state and of a security community that makes the application of violence among its members unthinkable. Concerns for social justice, human rights and environmental sustainability have found institutional forms that European states and the EU are seeking to advance in world affairs. Europe is gaining experience with consensual methods of decision making, in the form of its open method of coordination, soft law and various forms of informal consultations. It prefers diplomatic and political approaches to purely military solutions. It is these practices and preferences that put some meat on what is a transatlantic bone of contention – Europe’s normative power.

Europeanization is a set of processes that differ from Europe’s regional integration and European convergence. Although it overlaps with both of these processes, in important ways Europeanization is also distinctive from them.¹¹¹ At a maximum Europeanization leads to structural change that affects actors and institutions as well as ideas and interests. The actors involved in Europeanization can be individual, corporate or collective. At a minimum Europeanization involves responses to the policies of the European Union (EU). Europeanization has a dynamic quality that is inherently asymmetric and relational. It varies by degree, and it is not necessarily permanent or irreversible. Typically, Europeanization is incremental, uneven and irregular across both time and space. Johan Olson characterizes Europeanization as “a multitude of coevolving, parallel and not necessarily tightly coupled processes.”¹¹²

Kevin Featherstone distinguishes between four broad types of Europeanization: historical process, cultural diffusion, institutional adaptation, and policy responses centered on or around the EU.¹¹³ In the past Europeanization referred to exporting Europe’s authoritative norms and practices to colonies all over the world. Who constituted and stood for “Europe” was, however, highly variable as region, religion, class and nationality all set Europeans apart from one another. A second conceptualization focuses on transnational cultural diffusion of practices, ideas, norms, identities and discourses within Europe. Thirdly, as institutional adaptation Europeanization describes the pressures that are emanating


¹¹¹ Featherstone 2003.


¹¹³ Featherstone 2003, 5-12.
from Europe and the global system. It operates through positive (with the EU prescribing institutional models or policies) and negative integration (with the EU altering domestic legislation). Additionally, affecting preferences and strategies and operating outside of the EU, European policy can alter the beliefs and expectations of domestic actors. Finally Europeanization can also take the form of political responses that are shaped by the public policy impact of the EU on the central government administration, subnational authorities and policy networks of its member states. With respect to the EU, Europeanization is the result of multiple processes that are shaped by vulnerability, the institutional capacity to respond, the fit of EU policies with national policy legacies and preferences, and the policy discourses that influence preferences and thus affect the national sense of vulnerability and capacity.\textsuperscript{114} In its various manifestations Europeanization captures both processes that flow downward from the EU in terms of policy and upward from spontaneously acting groups or individuals. In both of these cases Europeanization is marked by cognitive shifts, changes in behavioral repertoires, and possibly forms of socialization that can lead to converging expectations and practices.\textsuperscript{115}

The variable combination of processes explains outcomes such as inertia, absorption or transformation. A fourth outcome is especially noteworthy. Europeanization does not have to be in contradiction to, or tension with, self-assertion. Instead it can operate as an appropriate form of self-interested national action.\textsuperscript{116} In his survey Featherstone concludes that the concept of Europeanization "can provide a gateway to developments across the continent that are both current and complex. It is precisely the breadth of application and the demanding explanatory framework needed that attests to the value and importance of the term. The contemporary reality of asymmetrical patterns of absorption, accommodations, and transformation . . . requires careful investigation."\textsuperscript{117}

Conclusion. In the study of civilizations Oswald Spengler reports as Copernican the discovery that Classical or Western civilization holds no privileged position compared to other civilizations which "in point of mass count for just as much in the general picture of history as the Classical, while frequently surpassing it in point of spiritual greatness and soaring power."\textsuperscript{118} Quite so. The West is distinctive but not superior or unique. Furthermore, America and Europe, Americanization and Europeanization point to the plural and pluralist character of the West. But it would be a mistake to put Western civilization in its various forms simply side-by-side to other civilizations. Instead all civilizations are embedded in a common context that is larger and more encompassing than its constituent parts. Shmuel Eisenstadt

\textsuperscript{114} Schmidt 2002.
\textsuperscript{115} Olsen 2007.
\textsuperscript{117} Featherstone 2003, 19.
\textsuperscript{118} Cox 2000, 218, fn5. Spengler 1939, 18.
calls this a civilization of modernity.\textsuperscript{119} William McNeill (1990) calls it a global ecumene.\textsuperscript{120} Jeremy Rifkin calls it the empathic civilization.\textsuperscript{121} These complementary concepts are driven by the same intuition which I explore in the next section.

5. One Global Civilization Containing Multiple Modernities

I argue here that one global civilization of multiple modernities gives space to two very different forms of transnationalism, illustrated here by Islam and Anglo-America. Grounded in different localities in both East and West, Islam’s transnationalism endows political actors with authority when they invoke their civilizational authenticities. Anglo-American transnationalism is also globe-spanning but of a different kind. Liberal, democratic capitalism ties the West to core aspects of a global civilization containing multiple modernities. Islam and Anglo-America illustrate how the civilization of modernity accommodates different notions of global space and civilizational time.\textsuperscript{122} In doing so it shows Islam and Anglo-America as two bridge civilizations reaching beyond East and West.

Multiple Modernities. Shmuel Eisenstadt argues that the civilization of modernity is a product of the recent past, starting with the scientific and technological revolution brought about by the European Enlightenment and marked by an unprecedented openness to novelty and uncertainty.\textsuperscript{123} Eisenstadt’s comprehensive, comparative analyses of a number of old world civilizations is the foundation for his central claim – the delayed impact that the different religions embodied in these civilizations had on the eventual emergence of one global civilization containing multiple modernities. Eisenstadt argues that the different religious cores and cultural programs of these older civilizations are historically grounded, continually reconstructed traditions. The religious centers of civilizations thus continue to have a strong impact on the unending reorganization and reinvention of their core states. Eisenstadt dissents from Weber’s Euro-centrism by insisting that reorganization and reinvention is shaped in all civilizations by specific antinomies: transcendental and mundane, universalistic and particularistic, totalistic and pluralistic, orthodox and heterodox. And these antinomies motivate political struggles that have a strong impact on political institutions, social and economic structures, and collective identities. All world civilizations have generated proto-fundamentalist movements. In the West, Jacobinism became an

\textsuperscript{119}Eisenstadt 2002a.

\textsuperscript{120}McNeill 1990.

\textsuperscript{121}Rifkin 2009. See also Bell 2006b.

\textsuperscript{122}Inglis 2010, 141. Perdue 2010.

\textsuperscript{123}My summary of Eisenstadt’s encompassing thought and voluminous writings is based on Katzenstein 2010a and Spohn 2001, 2010. Eisenstadt’s scholarship on this topic is a partial revision of his own writings on modernization dating back to the 1950s and 1960s, and a forceful dissent from contemporary globalization theory and the philosophical discourse on modernity and post-modernity.
oppositional movement in European civilization that exploded in the twentieth century under the
banners of Communism and Fascism. Modern fundamentalism in non-Western civilizations combines
the impact of Western Jacobinism with indigenous fundamentalist movements. Jacobin impulses in
modernity thus are not passing phenomena in the history of civilizations. They are permanent features
constitutive of modernity. Fundamentalism is an engine of change in all civilizations and a core aspect
of the civilization of modernity.

Early forms of modernities (of the sixteenth to eighteenth century) are a transitional phase that
exemplifies and deepens the theme of multiple modernities. Language offers a good explanation of
this period of transition. The turn to vernacular languages occurred in both Europe and India. In Europe,
but not in India, it was accompanied by the emergence of more clearly defined territorial boundaries. In
India, but not in Europe, vernacular languages complemented rather than replaced sacred languages of
Sanskrit and Pali. In China and Japan, classical languages and political orders survived those turbulent
centuries. While Chinese history records major breaks in the history of its different religions, the
civilizational state of Japan did not. Yet in both states a public sphere evolved in early modernity –
although one that was not tied, as in Europe, to civil society. Instead, China’s public sphere became the
world of academics and literati, which was tied closely to the official sphere. In Tokugawa Japan,
people and territory were united (kokka). But even in that holistic conception politically relevant
distinctions emerged, between official and non-official and between social and non-social. As in China,
the realm of the private was denigrated and widely regarded as undercutting the pursuit of the common
good. In Islamic law, Sufi orders constituted a dynamic public sphere that operated quite independently
from the political or official sphere. Charting such a multiplicity of early modernities undercuts the
charge of Euro-centrism in Eisenstadt’s civilizational analysis. Europe is, as Eisenstadt and Schluchter
argue, an analytical ideal type, not a normative reference point.

The first modern civilization was West European. Based on the Enlightenment and crystallized politically
in the American and French revolutions, it developed in the specific context of European Christianity. Its
cultural core was a bundle of cognitive and moral imperatives demanding more individual autonomy,
less traditional constraints, and more control over nature. The first modernity was constructed and
reconstructed in the specific context of Judeo-Greek-Christian cultural universalism and in the political
pluralism of its various center-periphery relations and political protest movements. Subsequently, West
European modernity was reinvented in Central and Eastern Europe, North and South America, and in
other non-European civilizations. For Eisenstadt the civilization of modernity is defined not by being

---

124 Pijl 2010, 178-222.

125 Eisenstadt and Schluchter 1998.


127 Woodside 2006.

128 Pasha 2007, 65, 70.

taken for granted, but by becoming a focal point of contestation, an object of uninterrupted conflict engaging both pre- and post-modern protest movements.\textsuperscript{130} The civilization of modernity embodies a multiplicity of different cultural programs and institutions of modernity that derive from the interaction between West European modernity and the various old world civilizations.

Modern societies thus do not converge on a common path involving capitalist industrialism, political democracy, modern welfare regimes, and pluralizing secularisms. Instead, diverse religious traditions are cultural sources for the enactment of different programs of modernity. West European modernity was transformed in the United States under the specific circumstances of a settler and immigrant society. This has given fundamentalist religious movements a large weight in the evolution of America’s multiple traditions and various dimensions of social structure, political institutions, and collective identities of the American state. A second example is offered by Japan’s reconstruction of modernity. Japan is based on specific patterns of emulation and selection that evolved a distinctive set of sociopolitical structures and collective identities. Since the Meiji revolution Japan’s deeply anchored syncretism of religious belief systems has been highly eclectic in the values it has adopted and flexible in the interpretation of the dramatic shifts in political context it has confronted.

The legacies of different world religions thus create multiple modernities as sources of cultural innovation. In the evolution of the socioeconomic, political–legal and technical–scientific dimensions of the civilization of modernity, forces of convergence are always balanced against forces of divergence. Modernity is inescapably multiple and undergoing a constant process of reinvention in which all traditional elements that rebel against it have themselves a modern, Jacobin character. Although the aspirations of the world’s important civilizational states may be totalistic, they are pluralistic in their cumulative impact on the multiple traditions that constitute one global civilization.\textsuperscript{131}

*Transnational Islam*. As a global civilization Islam spans East and West.\textsuperscript{132} Eighty-five percent of the world’s Muslims live outside of the Middle East, with the largest concentrations in Indonesia and in India. Hyphenated Islam, as in Afro- or Euro-Islam, speaks to the vitality of this civilization and its ability to ground itself in both East and West. It also leads to incongruities, such as the architectural absurdity of the kitsch rendition of Big Ben, called the Royal Mecca Clock, blown up to grotesque proportions and situated adjacent to the Grand Mosque in Mecca, the anchor of a gargantuan shopping mall, hotels, prayer halls and apartments. Visually it clashes even more relentlessly with its environment than do the super-churches in the suburban sprawl of the United States.\textsuperscript{133}

\textsuperscript{130} Eisenstadt 2002a, Kocka 2001, 6.


\textsuperscript{132} I am grateful to Bruce Lawrence, David Patel and Shawkat Toorawa for their suggestions for this section.

\textsuperscript{133} Ouroussoff 2010.
Two facts stand out about Islamic civilization. The Islamic world is global. It consists primarily of networks of social relations, rather than nations or states. The concept of Islam connotes, particularly in contemporary American political debates a monolithic myth. On closer inspection it spans East and West. Islam inhabits, as Ira Lapidus writes in the opening sentence of his magisterial history, “the middle regions of the planet.”\(^{134}\) Lapidus is building on Marshall Hodgson’s path-breaking work, a reformulation of world history in terms of the Afro-Asian complex in which Europe, the Middle East, India, and East Asia emerged as loosely-linked identifiable geographic spaces.\(^{135}\) Before the transmutation and rise of Europe after 1600, and all that followed in its wake, Islam was the shining exemplar of a premodern interregional civilizational complex. Persian and Turkish complemented Arabic in giving Islam a profoundly cosmopolitan stamp. Islam’s stateless ubiquity had enormous subversive potential, testified to by its global spread across the Afro-Eurasian landmass, encompassing China and the Far East, Southeast and South Asia, the Middle East, the Balkans and North Africa. After the rise of states and empires based on the power of the gun (Ottoman, Safavid and Mughal) the Middle East gradually began to be outflanked by the transmutation of the West.

While Islam rarely sums to the totality of Muslim lives’ experience, it “permeates their self-conception, regulates their daily existence, provides the bonds of society, and fulfills the yearning for salvation. The relevance of Islam to Muslim communities varies across the globe: as a religion, a political ideology, and a set of social practices. Yet, for all its diversity, Islam forges one of the great spiritual families of mankind.”\(^{136}\) Islam transcends the modern state system that has spread throughout the world during the last 350 years. The separation between mosque and state, and divine and human law has been of fundamental importance to Islam, as Patricia Crone argues.\(^{137}\) Yet this is not to deny the existence of multiple competing perspectives and vigorous contemporary debate on the nature and necessity of a secular state, the character of shari’a law, the impossibility of imposed religious adherence by the state, and the centrality of voluntary compliance with shari’a in various communities. While Islam and the state should be separated, Islam and politics should not.\(^{138}\) Secularisms, in the plural, thus are not necessarily barriers to the ideal, eventually to be realized, of one godly community, that will live under Islamic rule, governed by God’s law. The umma is fundamentally united, at least in theory. In practice its division in both premodern empires and today’s nation-states has been and continues to be an enduring political fact of life. Territorial pluralization is a deep legacy of Islam. At the same time Islam remains a truly global civilization. Between the 10th and the 18th centuries Muslim societies spread to all corners of the globe. Variegated as these societies were, they all interacted with Middle Eastern Islamic states,

\(^{134}\) Lapidus 1988, xix.


\(^{136}\) Lapidus 1988, xix.

\(^{137}\) Crone 2005.

religious and communal institutions, and local institutions and cultures. This created a world system of Islamic societies with significant shared cultural idioms and traditions.\textsuperscript{139}

The unified community of believers was to have both deep religious and political significance. Under the prophet and the first four righteous caliphates it was a community both tightly knit in religious beliefs and also endowed with imperial ambitions and universal claims. Thereafter vigorous intracivilizational debate was the rule. “The process of forming Islamic civilization was not a passive assimilation but an active struggle among the proponents of different views.”\textsuperscript{140} Proponents of Arabic, Persian and Hellenic literatures sought to shape the identity of the caliphate. Muslim urban communities stressed individual piety in the pursuit of Islamic life. Courtly Islam developed instead a cosmopolitan identity and worldview. The two were to compete and collaborate for more than a millennium. Subsequent splits between and within Sunni and Shi’a communities and between a series of Islamic empires in Arabia, the Indian subcontinent and in the Middle East provided additional grounds for sharp disagreements. Religious attitudes were, and continue to be, varied– scripturalist, fundamentalist, conservative, puritanical, accommodationist, realist and millenarian with each the result of intense political debate and conflict. In the last two centuries Islamic revivalism and Islamic reformism were political responses to intellectual and political tensions arising from within Islam as well as its encounters with other civilizations. “Today’s debates about the place and role of Islam in the world,” writes Peter Mandaville “are part of a complex genealogy of internal debates” that mark Islam’s history.\textsuperscript{141}

Western states had profound and differentiating effects on Muslim polities. One of these effects was that the caliphate as the human representation of Islamic unity became the target of increasingly rival claims and a dilution of authority before Turkey finally abolished it in 1924. The territorial pluralism of modern Islam replaced the original bifurcation between the Muslim (\textit{Dar al-Islam}) and the non-Muslim (\textit{Dar al-Harb}) world. With the growth of state and nation, and often placed under the impact of Western imperialism, hyphenated versions of Islam have sprung up as in Turkish-, Afro- or Euro-Islam. And a transnational Islam is having a profound effect on the identity of the Muslim diaspora. As Muslims seek to attach themselves to a universal \textit{ummah}, neo-fundamentalism is not so much a backlash against the West as a consequence of Westernization which brings in its wake new forms of radical and non-radical politics. Modern Islam has adjusted wearyly and to varying degrees, and on occasion not at all, to the modern world of states, while still remembering its very different point of historical origin and cherishing its hoped-for, very different point of destination.\textsuperscript{142} Muslim diasporic communities are far-flung and today are growing rapidly in all parts of the world. Insistence on unity thus clashes with the incontrovertible fact of diversity and the multiplicity of voices and traditions that diversity entails.\textsuperscript{143}

\textsuperscript{139} Lapidus 1988, 551.
\textsuperscript{140} Lapidus 1988,121.
\textsuperscript{141} Mandaville 2007, 147. See also Tibi 2009.
\textsuperscript{142} Mendelsohn 2009, 37-88.
\textsuperscript{143} Ayoob 2008, 23-41.
Lifting Islam out of the specific and manifold contexts in which it evolved historically is an act of reimagination undertaken by contemporary, at times extreme factions which are promoting an essentialist view of Islam as a unified civilizational context and political community. This it clearly is not. Instead, Islam is marked by internal contestations that can, but must not necessarily, generate conflicts when encountering other civilizations.

The decentralized network character of Islam make Islamicization a dynamic set of interrelated processes. Indonesia’s Islamicization began around 1300AD and has continued ever. It was helped by the fact that Indonesia was a way station for the trade between Canton, the largest seaport of the Tang dynasty, and the Muslim world. Islamization was peaceful, the work of Sufi missionaries from Gujarat and Bengal whose outlook was quite compatible with Hinduism. Although almost 90 percent of Indonesia’s population today are Muslim, Indonesia is not an Islamic state, and Islam is not the national faith. Yet Indonesia is in many respects an Islamic country as a unifying force acting on a fragmented Indonesian archipelago.

From its inception Islamic theology and religious practice spread rapidly. Religious traditions, such as the Islamic revivalism of the 18th century, articulated by Shah Walliullah and Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab, extended to religious instruction and practices which are exported today from, and generously supported by, Saudi Arabia. Islamic reformism in the middle of the 19th century and the creation of a Pan-Islamist movement by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani seeking to overturn colonial rule resonate with current debates about the relations between different branches of Islam and various modern secularisms. Islamicization includes all forms of long-distance trade and migration, both temporary, as in the hajj, and long-term. It also describes, as frequently noted since 9/11, small sects of radical activists seeking revolutionary change or a restoration of the caliphate. In its contemporary manifestation Islamicization encompasses not only the full gamut of consumption culture (such as food, dress, and popular music) exhibited by any modern shopping mall but also transnational communication channels — radio in the era of Pan-Arabism in the 1950s and 1960s, Al-Jazeera satellite TV and websites such as Islam Online today. Islamicization is thus an integral and vital part of Islamic history marked by the movement of people, goods and ideas across long distances and across political borders, the first instance in world history of a global civilizational complex encompassing all of Afro-Eurasia.

*Transnational Anglo-America.* Anglo-America’s both resembles and differs from Islam’s transnationalism. Kees van der Pijl’s trenchant historical analysis offers us an insight of how this came to

---

144 Ayoob 2008, 2.
146 Choi 1996.
Van der Pijl does not regard 1648 as the watershed separating the pre-modern from the modern period of international relations. Instead since 1688 international politics has become first and foremost an English-speaking transnational sphere of overseas settlement with Britain and eventually the United States at its center. Secured by maritime supremacy for Van der Pijl this “Lockean heartland” of Anglo-America has become the open center of the modern world order. This heartland is not an agglomeration of liberal states but a larger structure that embeds them. It is in fact the most consequential such structure that global history has seen in the last three centuries. This liberal transnational society was only incompletely unified, first by Britain and then by the United States. Its strength lies in a capacity for autonomous reproduction: in the form of constitutionally similar states, through the military defeat and conquest of rival states, and by the peaceful incorporation of states expressing other social formations and purposes.

The Glorious Revolution symbolized the end of a long historical process by which actors in civil society succeeded in constraining and containing the power of the Crown, a sharp contrast to the victory of absolutism on the European continent. Preoccupied by its civil war England did not look south, to Europe and the Westphalian system of 1648. Instead it looked west, across the Atlantic toward “New England” and later to its other settler societies in the Dominions. It was along this Atlantic, and later Pacific, axis that a self-regulating transnational Anglo-American society evolved. It forced continental Europe and subsequently most other parts of the world to rely on state sovereignty as the indispensible instrument with which to negotiate the various modernization processes that were foisted upon it. English language, property rights, the subordination of executive to legislative power, scientific and technological discovery and innovation, the rule of law, white racism and Protestant religion became some of the most distinctive institutions and practices enshrined by Anglo-America. In the Lockean heartland a chosen people was committed to maintain maximum freedom from the state. That people was endowed with ample doses of greed and generosity; it aimed at both exploiting and liberating others. Relatively autonomous settler colonies eventually spread those institutions and practices across the globe, from Britain to North America, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand. This Anglo-American heartland subsequently has contended with a parade of rivals in world politics -- France, Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union among them -- that have been integrated, more or less successfully, into an expanding West that continues to be internally vibrantly pluralist and externally connected through dense transnational networks and structures of global governance.

This expanding West has spawned in recent decades an array of different international regimes and global governance mechanisms covering virtually all imaginable issue areas. In their conceptualization as much as in their operation these regimes and governance mechanisms to date express the most advanced form of the West’s cultural domination over all of the states, including China and India, which

---

152 Pijl 2006.
are hoping to charter their independent development trajectory. The West thus both creates complex sovereignty and develops mechanisms for coping with complex interdependence. In a prescient article, Samuel Huntington recognizes the United States as the contemporary center of this transnational Anglo-American structure. The United States has been powered by the spread of transnational organizations. Access to foreign societies and economies and the freedom to operate in this transnational space matter more to it than territorial control. By and large, Anglo-America practices what it preaches in its highly internationalized arenas of domestic politics.

In chapter 8 Hermann Schwartz’s materialist analysis extends this framework. Schwartz shows that strong transnational connections were grounded in the pattern of Anglo-American land development that differed from continental Europe as well as from non-European non-frontier societies. Anglo-America evolved along three different institutional and political routes. The availability of vast tracks of land, the labor that this land attracted, and the capital that it generated all prevented a sharp demarcation of domestic from international affairs as the dynamic relations between the imperial center and settler societies evolved, first in a series of boom and bust cycles and later in relations marked by powerful transnational factors. Duncan Bell shows in chapter 2 how this transnationalism spurred the political imagination in the late 19th century for the creation of a Greater Britain that would encompass Anglo-America in one encompassing union under British leadership. Srdjan Vucetic shows in the first half of chapter 9 the salience of a shared Anglo-Saxon racial identity. And Audie Klotz argues in chapter 3 that what was most distinctive of the Anglo community in the first half of the 20th century was the tension between a racially white “external self” and a racially non-white “internal other.” Identity threats that emerged from encountering indigenous or immigrant populations experienced as foreign and threatening were thus countered by a transnational community based on racial identification. Klotz charts two subsequent stages in the evolution of that transnational community: the search for a contained political autonomy by the Dominions first and the emergence of a genuine multi-racial Commonwealth later.

In the second half of chapter 9 Srdjan Vucetic’s analysis of the replacement of an explicit liberal racism by an opaque liberal multiculturalism grounds the analysis that chapters 4-6 provide with their focus on Anglo-America’s complex sovereignty, diplomatic culture and special relations. Taken together, these three chapters point to Anglo-America’s relative openness as a distinctive quality. Pauly and Reus-Smit characterize in chapter 4 the transnational relationships within Anglo-America in terms of leadership and followership and shared purposes. Networks are the context in which complex sovereignties are negotiated as Canada and Australia manage their identities and autonomy. Controlling borders in a flexible manner that permits letting in what is considered desirable and keeping out what is considered undesirable is one illustration, especially for the case of the United States and Canada. Maximum feasible autonomy, not strict independence, describes this situation well. If there is convergence it is around the acceptance of political practices that create governing arrangements while at the same time

---


making it possible to accept enduring diversity. The politics of complex sovereignty they argue remains as open-ended as the boundaries around a manifold West blending into a civilization of modernity. In their inquiry into Anglo-America’s diplomatic cultures Brian Bow and Arturo Santa-Cruz argue in chapter 5 that the specific social content or relative “thickness” of a diplomatic culture is variable. From the perspective of civilizational analysis their baseline argument against materialist conceptions of an international system devoid all social meaning is compelling though relatively uninteresting. What they do establish however, is the gradient of social content between two different versions of the West, transatlantic and Western Hemispheric. And it is the felt difference in affinity, from the perspective of Washington, that evokes distinctly different diplomatic cultures in the relations between the United States and its neighbors to the North and South. Unresolved and for open to further research remains the question of whether and how the U.S.-Mexican diplomatic culture differs from the general diplomatic culture that characterizes the civilization of modernity in general. Finally, in chapter 6 David MacDonald and Brendon O’Connor focus on the institution of special relationships inside of Anglo-America. Strong bonds of common historical experience, shared interests and purposes, have had demonstrable and durable effects on a strategic culture which supports the notion of special relationship, first with Britain and later the United States. Special relations reflect conceptions of interest. But the strategic culture typifying it creates also a political language of sentimentality that at times can counter interests when they point away rather than toward Anglo-America. Special relations are an indispensible part of the imagination of Anglo-America.

Beyond being receptive to and engaged in transnational processes and practices Anglo-America’s transnationalism has been closely connected to the civilization of modernity both directly and indirectly. For one, it provides that civilization with its lingua franca. English has displaced French as the language of diplomacy and German as the language of science. English has spread as a global medium of communication. Today first, second and foreign language users total about 1.4 billion people, or about one-fifth of the world’s population. The majority of English users now lives in China and India. This is a substantial number especially if one considers that native speakers number only about 400 million. The cultural, economic and political advantages that the status of a world language conveys are numerous and undeniable. Yet, the spread of English may prove to be self-limiting. New varieties of spoken English are emerging around the world, such as Singlish (in Singapore), Estglish (in Estonia) and Chinglish (in China). Because they express multiple identities and imaginations, these “New Englishes” diverge greatly from standard English. Language is a living practice. And as languages spread they change. English may eventually go the way of classical Latin, which was superseded by vulgar Latin and subsequent linguistic fractionalization.

Extending the reach of Anglo-America, English may become increasingly severed from its roots, thus making it a characteristic of the civilization of modernity more than of any of its constituent parts. This is not to deny that language will retain its social context of meaning and will not be reducible to

155


156

Crystal 2004, 21-41.
universal signs of signification.\textsuperscript{157} Computer assisted translation and voice recognition may, however, make it quite possible that English will become something like “Globish.” This would make written English accessible on a global scale. And twitter and text messaging would make orthography and syntax less important. The next generation of American university students illustrates in their written work that language is situationally specific, more respectful of spelling and syntax in applications for opening at Goldman Sachs than in the world of new social media. Which is not to argue that the new world of Globish will not have its own form of stratification depending on the degree of expressiveness, fluency and diction.\textsuperscript{158} For now the only thing that is certain is that the multiplicity of languages and the ascendance of English as a limited \textit{lingua franca} connect Anglo-America closely to the civilization of multiple modernities.

Finding a shared language is an important achievement in the articulation of commonalities often experienced as differences. Charles Beitz’s analysis of the human rights revolution offers a compelling view of rights not as the substantive embodiment of Western, liberal values that others should emulate, now that the West itself has finally begun to acknowledge a common humanity. Rather Beitz looks at human rights as a kind of language, a “common idiom of social criticism in global politics.”\textsuperscript{159} As an emergent discursive and political practice, human rights operate as a form of practical reasoning that consolidates several different kinds of reasons justifying action. Engaging in that practice reveals a set of norms that frame both agreements and disagreements among members of a discursive community inhabited by state and non-state actors. The practice is constituted not by agreement on the content of norms or the behavioral consequences to which an acceptance of such norms would point. Contingent on historical circumstances, the normative content of these practices is open-ended, and its application to action is often contested.\textsuperscript{160}

Like human rights technology is a social process no longer controlled by either Anglo-Americans or any other set of actors. Over the course of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century Anglo-America has been a leading force in the advancement of technology. And technology has had a powerful effect on all societies while increasingly governing its own speed, direction and development through ever more competitive global markets. As the preferred instrument for reaching goals of equity and efficiency, technology is by its very nature now largely global and publicly accessible, with ministries of defense and some corporate actors still protecting secrecy in the name of national security and intellectual property, with limited success. World-wide availability of best technological practice has spread far and wide. Permissive of considerable national and regional variation,\textsuperscript{161} the commonality of the context is a defining aspect of one civilization of modernity.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Wierzbicka 2006.
\item McCrum 2010. Economist 2010b.
\item Beitz 2009, xi.
\item Beitz 2009, 8-9, 212.
\item Katzenstein 2005, 106-25.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
The popular culture industry points to still another avenue through which Anglo-America has affected the modern world. Throughout the 20th century Hollywood’s dream machine has been iconic as it fed the imagination of the world. Hollywood is in America but of the world. Surpassed now by Bollywood in sheer size, though not yet universal appeal, Hollywood has had an astonishing impact on the regional and at times global success of Japan’s popular entertainment industry. Just as Hollywood movies are now conceived and produced for a global DVD market and thus must contain or eliminate the specificities of the United States, the huge success of Japan’s entertainment industry has rested on its ability to rid itself of any specific Japanese cultural content. Instead the industry has developed a distinctive capacity to translate Western and American leisure products and a lifestyle of urban consumerism for Japanese and East Asian publics and thus to create a new sense of commonality connecting Japan and other parts of East Asia and beyond. Cross-over markets and hybrid products lead to genuine innovation in a sophisticated marketing strategy managing cycles that spin off hundreds even thousands of products. Distinctive of Japanese success was not originality which was Hollywood’s. It was the self-conscious decision to act as intermediary in cultural products that required an entrepreneurialism and imagination of all its own. In sum, the direct and indirect connections between Anglo-America and the civilization of modernity are numerous and far-reaching; they do not, however, chart a path toward convergence.

6. Conclusion

The openness of Anglo-America as one variant of the West resonates with Rémi Brague’s analysis. Brague argues that Europe and the West are empty containers lacking substantive content. In this view Rome, not Athens and Jerusalem, have defined the West. “Romany” makes its contribution by transmitting what it receives rather than by making its own contribution. The Hellenization of Roman culture shows that by transplanting Greek ideas Rome’s innovation was the very act of transmission rather than any act of cultural creation. The transplantation from Greece to Rome and then from Rome to a far-flung imperium was not an act of replication but of renewal. And so it was with the Roman Catholic Church in its relations with Israel. The church was Roman but the novelty of the Christ on which it rested was not. Unlike Greek philosophy and Hebrew prophecy Roman culture was processual. Understood in this way, a Roman West invented nothing but transmitted much and checked its pale self critically against more full blooded originals. In this civilization, and not in others, renaissance is a built-in cultural program. Rigidity and willful ignorance are to be found in all civilizations. In a civilization specializing in transmission it is experiencing the other openly and reexamining the self critically. Without denying many important differences, at its core this interpretation of the West resonates with Marshall Hodgson’s view of Islam as a transcivilizational ecumene with a synthetic vocation bridging East

---


163 Brague’s 2002.
and West. And it provides a plausible view of the dynamics of the global civilization of modernity Anglo-America and Islam inhabit together. Of these three it is the last one that is most marked by “Romanity.” Some will feel unsettled by this perspective and will want to contest it. But as a metaphor for a global civilization containing Anglo-America and Islam among its multiple modernities, Romanity is pregnant with insights that are deeper and more fruitful than superficial and misplaced historical analogy of imperial ventures gone astray.

Looking for alternative forms of analysis, Conservatives following Huntington insist on a unitary conception of civilizations but accept multiple standards of proper conduct in a world of numerous civilizations. Liberals follow an inverse logic. Unlike Huntington, they are often more willing to acknowledge the existence of diverse cultural programs in a given civilization. And unlike Huntington, they have a difficult time letting go of the notion of a single standard of good international and intercivilizational conduct. This is illustrated by vigorous and extended debates over failing states, standards of good governance, property rights, and transparent markets. On all of these issues, and many others, liberal arguments often proceed from the unquestioned assumption of the existence of a single standard of good conduct. In liberal American and European public discourse, the West thus is widely referred to in the singular: a universal, substantive form of perfectability that is integrating all parts of the world based on the growth of Western reason.

The overlapping of some of the traditions of Anglo-America and of Islam make this view highly implausible. The civilization of modernity is a global ecumene that expresses not a common standard but a loose sense of shared values entailing often contradictory notions of diversity in a common humanity. This loose sense of shared values centers on the material and psychological well-being of all humans. “Well-being” and the rights of all “humans” are no longer the prerogative or product of any one civilization or constellation of civilizations or political structures. Instead, technology serving human well-being and norms of human rights are deterritorialized processes that have taken on a life of their own and provide the script for all civilizations and polities. This ecumene does not specify the political route toward implementation. It does offer a script, often not adhered to, that provides everywhere today the basis for political authority and legitimacy. All polities claim to serve the well-being of individuals. And all individuals are acknowledged to have inherent rights. The capacities that inhere in all human are thus publicly recognized in the civilization of modernity. The existence of these processes enhances the pluralism that inheres in civilizations. It undercuts both the imperialism of imposing single standards and the relativism of accepting all political practices.

As part of a manifold West, Anglo-America resembles Islam in the bridges it builds that lead to somewhere. Anglo-America and Islam are empirical manifestation of a deeply intertwined and forever

---

165 See Katzenstein 2010b, 13.
166 Note also the recent discovery that the DNA of the inhabitants of the far West and the far East of the Eurasian landmass both contain the same amount of Neanderthal DNA, while none is found in the DNA of sub-Saharan Africans. Cookson 2010.
changing civilization of modernity containing plural and pluralist civilizations that are intertwined in an open-ended transcivilizational ecumene: poised always to stumble and fall into the abyss, ready always to dare and take a small step forwards onto uncharted territory.

References


Melling, Phil and Jon Roper, eds. 1996. *Americanisation and the Transformation of World Cultures: Melting Pot or Cultural Chernobyl?* Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen.


Roy, Oliver. 2004. *FIND*


